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Abstract
Using data from all U.S. corporate bond transactions in 2008, intermediation chains are
identified. Dealer centrality and past experience are used as proxies for the amount of
information that a dealer has about the valuation of a given bond. It is shown that dealers that are
closer together on a given intermediation chain are also expected to have closer levels of
information. These relationships hold for both investment grade bonds and junk bonds, as well as
both before and after the onset of the 2008 financial crisis. This implies that intermediation
chains in an over-the-counter market can be an effective way of responding to the presence of
high information asymmetries between dealers, end buyers, and end sellers.
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1

INTRODUCTION
This research project seeks to empirically support of the theories about the efficiency and

structure of over-the counter markets. This paper will examine the distribution of information
asymmetry along intermediation chains with the goal of comparing these observations with the
results predicted by theories of efficient intermediation, contributing to our understanding about
the need for greater regulation in over-the-counter markets.

1.1

Research Question
This paper will explore to what extent the structure of intermediation chains in U.S.

corporate bond markets post-TRACE support the hypothesis that an over-the-counter market can
still be efficient.

1.2

Hypothesis
In historical transaction data, it is expected that there are intermediation chains composed

of agents that gradually vary in the amount of information they have. Furthermore, a significant
number of chains with multiple dealers are should appear. This hypothesis relies on the theory
proposed in Glode and Opp (2016), which is that intermediation chains can actually lead to more
efficient marketplace when there are significant information asymmetries between the ultimate
sellers and buyers. Even when a bond is best held by another party, it can be difficult and
unlikely for that transaction to happen if the size of the information asymmetry impedes trading.
Glode and Opp suggest that intermediation chains can be an efficient solution to this problem
when the different agents in the chain have heterogeneous information. As a result, the
information asymmetry between two adjacent agents in the intermediation chain is small. It is
reasonable for differences in private information to be a major obstacle to efficient trade in the
U.S. corporate bond secondary market, especially for sparsely traded or distressed debt.
If there are only short intermediation chains with a few central, well-connected
intermediaries, or if all intermediaries are very similarly informed, this may suggest that
information asymmetries are not the dominant issue – instead, bargaining frictions or other
market imperfections may be a larger issue. It is likely that the relative importance of these
different factors fluctuates over time, in different market regimes: given literature showing that
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dealers tend to rely on long-standing relationships when in periods of heightened uncertainty (Di
Maggio, Kermani, and Song, 2016), this suggests that bargaining risks and reputation are at the
forefront of traders’ minds during these times of crisis. As such, it is expected that the previously
described behavior in response to information asymmetry is stronger in times of relative
economic stability.

2

LITERATURE REVIEW
The field of over-the-counter market structure research largely focuses on a simple

question: is centralization or intermediation more efficient for over-the-counter (OTC) markets?
Typically, financial products that tend to have less liquidity and more variation are still traded on
OTC markets, instead of a centralized exchange, such as corporate bonds or long-dated options.
Given the sheer volume of trading activity that flows through OTC markets every day, as well as
the increasing interconnectedness of global financial markets, it is essential to understand
whether such a market structure leads to inefficient trade or over-concentration of market power
(Morris and Shin, 2012). Historically, OTC markets have been opaque and deal-at-your-own-risk
(Glode and Opp, 2016), but there has been a recent push from the SEC and other regulators for
increased transparency and oversight (Clayton 2018).

2.1

Theoretical Literature
The theoretical literature is fragmented, but is generally becoming less averse to

decentralization. Akerloff (1970), Morris and Shin (2012), and Glode and Opp (2017), all
describe models of information asymmetry between dealers and customers; in particular, Glode
and Opp argue that under a certain distribution of information, intermediation chains can be as
efficient as outside intervention. Li (1998) and Viswanathan and Wang (2004) look at inventory
risk as an alternate contributor to the formation and apparent stability of long intermediation
chains. They propose a model of interdealer trading where dealers are acutely conscious of
inventory risk and seek to minimize it, leading to “hot potato” behavior. However, while models
of various dealer behaviors have been proposed, under diverse sets of constraints, there has not
been a consensus reached on which of these circumstances actually occur more often in practice,
and which may dominate the other.
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2.2

Empirical Work
The amount and quality of empirical work has depended heavily on the availability and

quality of data for a particular market: for corporate bonds, empirical studies have become more
granular in describing intermediation chains and transaction costs after the advent of the Trade
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) in 2002. Now, with the comprehensive
transaction-level detail given by TRACE, we are beginning to see researchers conduct more
granular studies on the structure and functioning of the corporate bond market. Other OTC
markets that have been similarly scrutinized include collateralized mortgage obligations
(CMOs), municipal bonds, and asset-backed securities (ABS) (Li and Schürhoff, 2014;
Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt, 2017). Many of these markets are treated as analogous, and
results from one market often hold for other OTC markets experiencing similar levels of
information asymmetry or search frictions.
One line of research involves attempting to measure certain characteristics of OTC
markets, like information asymmetry, liquidity, and efficiency. The field agrees on certain
characteristics that correspond with larger transaction costs, and these have persisted despite
increased recent moves toward greater transparency: dealers tend to quote worse prices if you are
offering a small trade size, a retail customer, trading an off-the-run bond, or trading a bond with
significant credit risk or complexity (Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar, 2007; Schultz 2001;
Goldstein and Hotchkiss, 2017; and O’Hara, Wang, and Zhou, 2018). Jiang and Sun (2015) and
Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2017) have also taken steps toward showing that dealer behavior
suggests there does exist information asymmetries and inventory risk in corporate bond markets,
but their metrics are at a broader market-level and do not fully describe the distribution of
information asymmetry or risk amongst dealers in an intermediation chain.
In addition, researchers have examined the structure of the market itself. One clear
structure of OTC markets has been described in more recent empirical studies: a core-periphery
structure, where some highly interconnected dealers sit in the “core”, while less well connected
agents are in the periphery and primarily trade through the core rather than directly with each
other. Originally coined by Li and Schürhoff (2014) when examining municipal bond markets,
other researchers have followed suit in demonstrating its existence in securitization markets like
ABS, CMO, and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt,
2017). Nonetheless, given the diversity of OTC markets, not every market has been shown to
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demonstrate this structure, and there has not been a comprehensive empirical study on where and
when a core-periphery model applies.
In the area of measuring information asymmetries, much of the existing literature
revolves around measuring the aggregate “level” of asymmetry in the marketplace over time,
instead of its presence and effects on individual intermediation chains or trades. As mentioned
above, there are studies explore how the market structure and efficiency changes around periods
of heightened asymmetry: Jiang and Sun (2015) examine changes in asymmetry from news
releases; Green, Hollifield, and Schürhoff (2007) examine the increase in asymmetry postissuance for municipal bonds; Di Maggio, Kermani, and Song (2016) look at changes in trading
behavior in the 2008 credit crunch; and Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) study effects from
the introduction of TRACE. There is less literature in the field of OTC markets on estimating
levels of information for different agents and its impact on how they trade with each other;
however, there are interesting accounting papers, especially in the area of debt covenants and
issuance, which attempt to deal with this topic. Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari (2008) explore how
issuers of syndicated loans trade with the primary buyers; in particular, how the quality of
information disclosed by the financial statements of the borrower affects how that loan issue
trades. However, this is concerned with the primary market, which is structured differently from
the secondary market.

3

DATA

3.1

Description of Data

The primary dataset is the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine data, collected by the
Financial Industry Regulatory Agency (FINRA) on corporate bond trading. In its raw form, this
includes every report of a corporate bond trade, with price, volume, time, whether the reporting
party is a dealer or a customer, whether the counterparty is a dealer or a customer, which bond
was traded, and other details about the coupon remaining on the bond. In particular, the
Academic TRACE dataset is used, which includes a masked identifier of FINRA dealer IDs for
each transaction. These analyses use data on all corporate bond transactions in 2008. The data
cleaning procedure follows the steps outlined in Dick-Nielsen (2009), which removes
cancellations, updates trade reports with corrections, and removes duplicates. Beginning with
9,057,733 trade reports, this procedure yielded 7,060,831 cleaned trade reports.
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A secondary dataset used is the MERGENT database, which describes each bond issue.
Its three broad areas of coverage are information about bond issues (ex. interest rates, convertible
terms, unit offerings, covenants), bond issuers (ex. name, SIC code), and bond redemptions (ex.
terms of redemption, additional restrictions or options).
3.2

Identification of Intermediation Chains
Intermediation chains were constructed using similar criteria as reported by Li and

Schürhoff. The end buyer and seller are customers without FINRA dealer IDs. A chain is
initiated when a dealer purchases bonds from a customer, and ends when a dealer sells bonds to a
customer. Trades in the chain must have matching CUSIPs and dealer IDs, and two consecutive
trades must occur within a time window of 10 days.
Unlike the analyses conducted in Li and Schürhoff (2014) and Goldstein and Hotchkiss,
(2017), this algorithm allows for splitting and bundling behavior by the dealers at any step of the
intermediation chain, counting these as new chains. For example, if Dealer A buys 500 bonds
from a customer, then sells 250 to Dealer B and 250 to Dealer C, who each sell to an end buyer
customer, the algorithm identifies both chains (A-B and A-C).
Figure 1. Histogram of Chain Lengths
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In total, 586862 such chains were identified in the dataset. They were 2.4 trades long on
average, and 26% percent were over 3 trades long. As shown in Figure 1, there is a sharp drop
off in the number of chains observed for higher values of chain length, but there is still a
substantial number of longer chains. Compared to Li and Schurhoff’s observations about the
municipal bond market, which had almost no chains longer than 8 dealers long, this suggests that
perhaps the U.S. corporate bond market in 2008 had more complexity in intermediation chains.
Another possible explanation is that dealers in the middle of long intermediation chains typically
bundle and split orders of bonds, so the municipal bond market has similarly long intermediation
chains, but they were not identified.

4

INFORMATION PROXY VARIABLES

4.1

Regression
The regression model used was:

where b1 is the coefficient for the difference in information; and b2, b3, and b4 are coefficients for
the various controls. The specification of each group of controls is described in section 5.
The response variable Degree of separation was selected to describe how far apart two
given dealers are on a given intermediation chain. Both absolute and normalized versions of this
variable were constructed, with the latter normalized for chain length. The formulas are as
follows:
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑏𝑠. = 𝑖 − 𝑗
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚. =

𝑖−𝑗
𝑙

Here, l represents chain length, and i, j are the positions of two dealers, so i, j < l, and i ≠
j.
Thus, this regression imagines that the expected degree of separation of any two dealers
on a chain depends on not only on what they are trading, the nature of the overall chain, and
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characteristics of their respective trades, but also on the magnitude of difference of information
that they possess.

4.2

Centrality
A dealer that is well connected within the dealer network would be expected to also be

better informed about the private valuations held by its potential counterparties for a given bond.
As such, one proxy variable for information held by a dealer is its centrality within the dealer
network, as constructed from trades.
Figure 2. Sample of Dealer Network

Taking all the interdealer trades that occurred in 2008, a graph is constructed between the
dealers. Figure 2 plots the relationships found in a random sample of the data, and serves as an
illustration of the graph structure of this network. The entire interdealer network graph displays
characteristics similar to that of the municipal bond interdealer network in Li and Schürhoff
(2014). Note that there appears to be a core periphery structure, with a single “core” of
exceptionally well connected dealers, and a periphery of less well connected dealers.
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Selected measures of centrality from Li and Schurhoff (2014) are used to construct the
Centrality features: degree, coreness, eigenvector centrality, betweenness, and transitivity.
Measures that are not highly dependent on proximity to neighbors are preferred; measures like
closeness are not used, as they are too reliant on the “distance” between a dealer and its
neighbors by definition and thus may trivially produce a positive correlation when used as an
explanatory variable for Degree of separation.
For all measures, if both dealers are assigned a high value in that measure of centrality
and thus a low difference in centrality, then by construction this does correlate with being closer
in given chain. However, this is somewhat mitigated by the fact that these measures of centrality
are calculated using all trades, while a given chain can only have trades of one bond issue.
Furthermore, if one dealer is assigned a high value and one a low value, or if both are assigned a
low value, this does not necessarily force any particular relationship with Degrees of separation
by construction.
To reduce issues of collinearity, these measures are transformed using principal
component analysis (PCA), and the first and second components are used to construct the
features used in the regression. The first two components are sufficient to capture 83.9% of the
variance in the original set of input variables, which is a reasonable amount of information
retained.
Table 1. Principal Component Analysis Rotation
Degree (out)
Degree (in)
Coreness (out)
Coreness (in)
Eigenvector
Centrality
Betweenness
Cliquishness

PCA1
-0.431
-0.434
-0.413
-0.422

PCA2
-0.010
-0.024
0.020
0.010

-0.427

-0.021

-0.309
0.033

-0.035
-0.999

The rotation of a given component in a PCA describes how much each input variable
variable is weighted in this component. As such, Table 1 shows that the first component is
primarily based on the degree and coreness of a dealer. The degree is a simple measure of the
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number of dealers a firm is connected to, while the coreness is a measure of the number of
subnetworks a given dealer is in. The second component is largely composed of cliquishness,
which measures how tightly connected a dealer is to its closest trading partners.
The features ∆ Centrality (PCA1) and ∆ Centrality (PCA2) are then defined as:
∆ 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑃𝐶𝐴1 = 𝑎< − 𝑎=
∆ 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑃𝐶𝐴2 = |𝑏< − 𝑏= |
where aj, ak are the values of PCA1 for the dealers j and k on some intermediation chain; and
similarly for bj, bk.
4.3

Rating Class Expertise
Another proxy for information could be the dealer’s familiarity with bonds with a similar

rating. For example, a dealer may have particularly good experience and thus information about
trading junk bonds. This is approximated using the market share of a given dealer measured by
percent of trades it is in involved in, out of all trades that occurred in that credit rating. Credit
rating is coded as three classes: tier 1 (Aaa – Baa3), tier 2 (Ba1 – B), and tier 3 (Caa1 - C). This
feature is called rating class expertise and is defined as:
𝑐<,B =

𝑡<,B
C 𝑡C,B

where 𝑐<,B is the level of rating class expertise held by a dealer j in rating class r. The difference
in information is defined similarly to the centrality measure, and the formula is as follows.
∆ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑒 = 𝑐<,B − 𝑐=,B

5

CONTROLS

5.1

Bond Controls
Characteristics specific to the bond issue and the bond issuer were controlled: the credit

rating of the issuer and the industry of the issuer. For a given pair of trades on a chain, these
characteristics correspond to the time that the first trade occurs. The credit rating is coded using a
10 tier system that standardizes the rating across rating agencies, and the industry of the issuer is
coded using its MERGENT industry code (Appendix A).
5.2

Trade Controls
As the Degree of separation measure is defined as the distance between the trade where
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the first dealer acts as a buyer and the trade where the second dealer acts as a buyer,
characteristics pertaining to the pair of trades in question are also controlled. The difference in
time, volume, and price between the two trades are control variables.
5.3

Chain Controls
Lastly, the chain that the pair of firms is taken from has characteristics that may influence

how far apart they are. We construct features to control for length of chain, total time elapsed
from start to finish of chain, time to maturity for the bond issue, and whether the last trade of the
chain occurred before the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.
The feature for time to maturity for the bond issue is defined as an indicator variable that
equals 1 if the first trade of the intermediation chain occurred within two months of the bond’s
maturity date, and 0 otherwise. Trading volumes seem to be elevated during that period of time,
as bondholders react to changes in value since they purchased the bond, and consider how they
would like to exit. Similarly, the feature related to the Lehman bankruptcy is an indicator
variable that equals 1 if the last trade of the intermediation chain occurred after Lehman filed for
bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, an event typically considered the beginning of the credit
crisis. The onset of the financial crisis would be expected to have a significant impact on bond
trades.

6

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

6.1

All 2008 U.S. Corporate Bond Data
Using the features and regression described above, the analysis is conducted on all chains

that have an identifiable beginning and end customer.
First, the relationship between the information proxy variables and the distance between
dealers on a given chain is examined, independent of any controls.
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Figure 3. Distribution of ∆ Rating Class Expertise, Chains of Length 10

As an illustration, Figure 3 is a density plot using data from intermediation chains of
length 10. The two overlaid curves compare the shape of the distribution of difference in
information for two dealers that are one degree of separation apart, versus the distribution for
dealers that are at extreme ends of the chain. The pattern exhibited in Figure 3 holds when
looking at any given length of intermediation chain, and for all three information proxy
variables: the distribution for difference in information between two dealers that are farther apart
on a chain is more right skewed than the corresponding distribution for dealer that are close
together on a chain. This corresponds with the expectation that long intermediation chains can
reduce issues of information asymmetry by allowing dealers to trade with counterparties that
have similar levels of information.
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Table 2. Difference in Information
and Degreeon
of Various
Separation
Table1. Regression
Subsets
(1)
(2)
(3)
Normalized Degree of Separation
Absolute Degree of
Baseline w/o Controls Baseline w/ Controls Separation, Baseline
Δ Centrality (PCA1)

9.08×10-4
[5.4×10-5]***

1.25×10-3
[5.0×10-5]***

6.29×10-3
[5.3×10-4]***

Δ Centrality (PCA2)

−6.25×10 -2
[8.6×10-4]***

−6.67×10 -2
[7.9×10-4]***

−0.305
[8.4×10-3]***

0.785
[0.030]***

0.158
[0.028]***

1.05
[0.30]***

0.00183

0.158

0.556

702584

702584

702584

Δ Rating Expertise
R2 (Adjusted)
N (observations)

Significance levels are indicated by *(0.05), **(0.01), and ***(0.001). Standard errors are shown
in square brackets. For a full table of coefficients for column (2), see Appendix B.
The coefficient estimates for ∆ Centrality (PCA1) and ∆ Rating Class Expertise are
positive and significant. This suggests that the correlation is in the direction predicted by Glode
and Opp; that is, firms with similar levels of information will also tend to be closer together on a
given intermediation chain. The magnitude of the effect of the difference is not straightforwardly
interpretable, however, given the varying units of the graph centrality measures from which the
PCA component was derived.
On the other hand, the coefficient estimate for ∆ Centrality (PCA2) was negative and
significant. This is different from what the theory predicts, and one possible explanation is that
this is simply not a good measure of information. ∆ Centrality (PCA2) is almost entirely
composed of the cliquishness measure, and this may not be a good proxy for how well informed
a dealer is, since it is such a locally constructed metric that depends on how many trades a dealer
conducts with the firms closest to it in the network. If two dealers both have low levels of
cliquishness, then by definition they are less likely to be close to each other on an intermediation
chain. This can be overcome if there is an information effect as posited by Glode and Opp, but
perhaps in this particular market, cliquishness does not correspond with being better informed
about the private valuations of other people in the market.
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6.2

Subset Analyses
Two methods of subsetting are selected for further investigation. The investment grade

bond market is compared to the junk bond market, and the pre-Lehman bankruptcy bond market
is compared to the post-Lehman bankruptcy bond market.
First, an interesting result about the distribution of the ∆ Centrality (PCA1) variable
across the pre- and post-Lehman bankruptcy subsets is discussed.
Figure 3. Distribution of ∆ Centrality (PCA1), Chains of Length 3

Using data from chains of length 3, pane 1 of Figure 3 compares the distribution of ∆
Centrality (PCA1) for pairs of dealers that are one degree of separation apart on chains that
occurred before Lehman, versus pairs of dealers one degree apart on chains that occurred after
Lehman. Similarly, pane 2 and 3 compare the distributions for pairs of dealers that are two and
three degrees of separation apart, respectively.
It is interesting to note that despite the massive upheaval in global financial markets
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during the last few months of 2008, these shapes remain remarkably constant, with only slight
changes in shape. It seems that the structure of the interdealer market and the relationships
between dealers were largely resilient and persistent through this initial phase of the credit crisis.
Now using the same model described in section 4.1 “Regression”, data from each subset
is used to obtain estimates of coefficients for each information proxy variable.
Table 3. Difference in Information and Degree of Separation, IG vs. Junk and Before vs.
After Lehman
(1)
IG

Normalized Degree of Separation
(2)
(3)
(4)
Junk
Before Lehman After Lehman

Δ Centrality (PCA1)

8.52×10-4
1.97×10-3
[5.8×10-5]*** [9.9×10-5]***

1.89×10-3
[6.2×10-5]***

4.84×10-4
[8.3×10-5]***

Δ Centrality (PCA2)

−6.22×10 -2
−7.71×10 -2
[9.2×10-4]*** [1.5×10-3]***

−7.34×10 -2
[9.9×10-4]***

−5.82×10 -2
[1.3×10-3]***

Δ Rating Expertise
R2 (Adjusted)
N (observations)

0.210
[0.031]***

0.155
[0.065]*

−0.304
[0.035]***

0.529
[0.046]***

0.147

0.187

0.186

0.154

496725

205859

415708

286876

For a full table that includes coefficient estimates and significance levels of control variables, see
Appendix C.
Considering the differences between investment grade bonds versus junk bonds, it is
expected that the role played by various types of information would also differ in their
corresponding secondary markets. When trading junk bonds, there is more complexity in
determining the fundamental value of the company, which is less related to centrality; on the
other hand, it can also be more difficult to identify end customers for junk bonds, which would
be related to centrality. Since the coefficient estimates for ∆ Centrality (PCA1) and ∆ Centrality
(PCA2) are similar for both investment grade bonds and junk bonds, this suggests that neither
factor overwhelmingly dominates the other in the junk bond market. Furthermore, the coefficient
estimate for ∆ Rating Class Expertise is similar for both investment grade bonds and junk bonds.
More specialized investors and intermediaries trade junk bonds, as they are riskier, less
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conventional holdings, so it is surprising that the importance of expertise is not markedly higher
for junk bonds.
Comparing the coefficient estimates for chains that ended before the Lehman bankruptcy
versus chains that ended after the Lehman bankruptcy, the results are reasonably for ∆ Centrality
(PCA1) and ∆ Rating Class Expertise; the signs and significance levels of the coefficient
estimates remained the same. However, the coefficient estimate for ∆ Centrality (PCA2) is
positive and significant only after the Lehman bankruptcy. This could be interpreted to mean that
during times of higher information asymmetry or panic, the strength of a dealer’s connections
with those that it is closest to becomes a more important determinant of how much a dealer
knows about the market participants’ private valuations, which seems like a reasonable
possibility.

7

CONCLUSION
We examine the U.S. corporate bond market in 2008 as a representative of an over-the-

counter market with significant levels of information asymmetry. Using centrality and expertise
in the relevant ratings class as proxies for the amount of information that a dealer has about a
bond, we find that dealers that are closer together on a given intermediation chain will also have
closer levels of information. These findings support the idea that dealers tend to trade with
counterparties that have a similar level of information, so that the disparity between any two
dealers on a given chain is less than the overall difference in information across the whole chain.
It was found that the relationship between information and dealer location on an intermediation
chain is similar across bond ratings, and even remains robust through the Lehman bankruptcy
and subsequent crisis. Thus, extending this result by applying Glode and Opp’s theory of
intermediation chains with a view towards their role in markets with information asymmetries,
long intermediation chains can in fact be an efficient way of organizing such markets.
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Appendix A: Control Variables for Bond Characteristics

Table A1. Credit Rating Group Codes
Rating Group
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Moody’s

S&P

Aaa

AAA

Aa1, Aa2, Aa3
A1, A2, A3
Baa1, Baa2, Baa3
Ba1, Ba2, Ba3
B1, B2, B3
Caa1, Caa2, Caa3
Ca
C

AA, AA-, AA+
A+, A, ABBB+, BBB, BBBBB+, BB-, BB
B+, B-, B
CCC+, CCC-, CCC
CC
D

Note: bonds that were not rated were assigned to Rating Group 10.
Table A2. MERGENT Industry Codes
Industry

Industry

10

Manufacturing

26

Leasing Utility

11

Media/Communications

30

Electric

12

Oil & Gas

31

Gas

13

Railroad

32

Telephone

14

Retail

33

Water

15

Service/Leisure

40

Foreign Agencies

16

Transportation

99

Unassigned

20

Banking

21

Credit/Financing

22

Financial Services

23

Insurance

24

Real Estate

25

Savings & Loan

22
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Appendix B: Table 2, Column (2) Extended
Normalized Degree of Separation,
Baseline w/ Controls
Time elapsed between trades
1.93E-07
Difference in volume between trades
-5.37E-10
Difference in price between trades
4.30E-04
Close to maturity
8.62E-03
Close to offering
-9.58E-03
Industry Code 11
3.26E-03
Industry Code 12
1.78E-03
Industry Code 13
2.11E-02
Industry Code 14
-1.50E-04
Industry Code 15
-5.50E-03
Industry Code 16
-7.85E-03
Industry Code 20
1.66E-02
Industry Code 21
5.99E-03
Industry Code 22
2.28E-03
Industry Code 23
6.21E-03
Industry Code 24
-2.75E-03
Industry Code 25
-4.39E-03
Industry Code 26
1.18E-02
Industry Code 30
1.25E-02
Industry Code 31
1.40E-02
Industry Code 32
3.30E-03
Industry Code 33
-1.02E-02
Industry Code 40
1.91E-02
Industry Code 99
1.10E-02
Rating Group 2
7.96E-03
Rating Group 3
-2.98E-03
Rating Group 4
-8.53E-04
Rating Group 5
-1.34E-02
Rating Group 6
-1.28E-02
Rating Group 7
-1.11E-02
Rating Group 8
-1.03E-02
Rating Group 9
-1.45E-02
Rating Group 10
-1.96E-03
Lehman bankruptcy flag
5.70E-03

Significance levels are indicated by *(0.05), **(0.01), and ***(0.001).

***
***
***
***
***
***
*
***
***
***
***
***
***

***
***

**
*
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
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Appendix C: Table 3, Extended

(1)
Separation,
IG
Time elapsed between trades
1.86E-07
Difference in volume between trades
-9.32E-10
Difference in price between trades
4.46E-04
Close to maturity
2.00E-02
Close to offering
-1.40E-02
Industry Code 11
5.16E-03
Industry Code 12
1.40E-03
Industry Code 13
1.24E-02
Industry Code 14
-6.72E-04
Industry Code 15
2.90E-03
Industry Code 16
-1.23E-02
Industry Code 20
1.34E-02
Industry Code 21
2.09E-03
Industry Code 22
-5.56E-04
Industry Code 23
4.32E-03
Industry Code 24
-6.78E-03
Industry Code 25
-1.49E-03
Industry Code 26
6.93E-03
Industry Code 30
1.37E-02
Industry Code 31
1.91E-02
Industry Code 32
2.20E-03
Industry Code 33
2.19E-02
Industry Code 40
1.51E-02
Industry Code 99
Rating Group 2
4.59E-03
Rating Group 3
-4.62E-03
Rating Group 4
-4.07E-03
Rating Group 5
Rating Group 6
Rating Group 7
Rating Group 8
Rating Group 9
Rating Group 10

Normalized Degree of Separation
(2)
(3)
Before
Junk
Lehman
***
2.12E-07 ***
1.99E-07 ***
*** -1.80E-10 *** -2.19E-10 ***
***
7.52E-04 ***
1.83E-04 *
***
5.36E-03 ***
1.58E-02 ***
***
1.21E-02 ***
1.55E-03
*** -1.25E-03
2.98E-03 ***
-2.33E-04
-1.87E-03
2.51E-02
1.33E-02
-1.23E-05
-2.72E-03 *
*
-8.03E-03 *** -1.27E-04
*** -4.30E-03
-1.31E-02 ***
***
2.45E-02 ***
6.70E-03 ***
*
6.93E-03 ***
3.08E-03 ***
1.34E-02 ***
1.78E-03 *
***
1.15E-02 ***
6.04E-03 ***
*
2.68E-03
-6.71E-04
-5.12E-03
-8.32E-03
7.35E-02
-1.83E-03
***
4.69E-03
9.16E-03 ***
***
6.39E-03
3.17E-03
6.45E-03
-6.47E-04
-2.21E-02
-2.72E-02
*
4.85E-02
1.25E-02
8.44E-03
8.51E-03
***
-7.10E-04
***
-3.36E-03 **
***
-1.77E-03
-4.10E-03 **
1.91E-03
-1.70E-03
5.57E-03 ***
4.53E-03 **
1.11E-02 *** -5.03E-03 *
-3.18E-03
-7.25E-03 ***
7.14E-03 *** -1.99E-03

Significance levels are indicated by *(0.05), **(0.01), and ***(0.001).

(4)
After
Lehman
1.99E-07
-9.63E-10
3.90E-04
6.52E-04
-1.88E-02
6.18E-04
4.12E-04
3.90E-02
-7.22E-06
-4.53E-03
5.53E-04
1.47E-02
8.50E-03
3.43E-04
4.12E-03
-8.05E-03
8.70E-03
5.58E-02
1.16E-02
1.83E-02
3.39E-03
5.78E-03
1.94E-02
5.01E-03
1.34E-02
-5.82E-04
-1.14E-03
-1.35E-02
-1.65E-02
-9.68E-03
-9.02E-03
-1.76E-02
-2.95E-03

***
***
***
***

***
**
***
***
*
*

***
***

***

***
***
***
***
***

